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I. INTRODUCTION

M

ANAGERIAL agency costs are ubiquitous in the modern public corporation. Agency costs arise from the separation of ownership and
control and reflect the divergence between share-value-maximizing actions of managers and managers’ actual actions, plus the monitoring and
bonding expenditures (including contracting costs) undertaken to reduce
that divergence.1 Agency costs vary firm by firm, but regulatory actions
and even business practices can have a systematic impact on agency costs.
For example, increased or decreased enforcement of insider trading rules
can affect agency costs across a wide spectrum of companies.
Who bears the burden of corporate agency costs? Who gains or suffers when agency costs rise or fall systematically? To the extent that corporate governance experts have considered this question, they have assumed,
explicitly or implicitly, that shareholders bear these costs as the recipients
of residual corporate returns.2
* Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston
University School of Law. For their valuable comments on this Article and related
work, I thank Victor Fleischer, Louis Kaplow, Andrew Lund, Mike Meurer, Gregg
Polsky, Fred Tung, David Webber, Chuck Whitehead, and participants in the
Villanova Law Review Norman J. Shachoy Symposium on taxation. I thank William
Becker and David Skinner for excellent research assistance.
1. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 785 (2002).
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This Article suggests that, from an incidence perspective, managerial
agency costs can be analogized to the corporate income tax. Both can be
thought of as differential taxes on investment in corporate equity. Fifty
years of research on the incidence of corporate income taxes suggests that
the view that shareholders bear the entire cost or enjoy the entire benefit
of changes in agency costs is too simplistic.3 Both theoretical and empirical work on incidence indicate that corporate taxes, and, if the analogy
holds, agency costs, may be borne over the long run by suppliers of capital
and labor to the general economy to a significant degree. Exactly how
much of the burden is borne by investors and how much by workers is a
hotly contested question, but the evidence suggests that shareholders are
unlikely to bear the full burden.
In keeping with the theme of this section of the symposium, this Article focuses on the incidence of one particular manifestation of managerial
agency costs—excessive executive pay—while recognizing that the implications of the analysis are much broader. Although the point is contested,
many commentators and analysts believe that executive pay at U.S. public
companies reflects systematic market failure, and, as a result, executives
receive more compensation than they would in a well-functioning market.4 For the purposes of this Article, I accept the premise of systematic
market failure and ask at whose expense this excess pay is extracted.5 The
answer, I believe, is that some fraction of the cost of systematically excessive executive pay is likely to be shifted from shareholders to other investors, labor, or both.
Of course, the extraction of excessive executive pay is likely to have
other adverse consequences beyond the transfer of funds from shareholders, other investors, and workers to executives. The managerial power
view of the executive compensation setting process implies that the design
of executive pay packages will be distorted from the most efficient design
3. See infra notes 45–68 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991); Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 751; Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65
J. FIN. 2363 (2010); Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay,
21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents with and Without Principals, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 203 (2000); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones
Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901 (2001).
5. Although I accept this premise for the purposes of this Article, I recognize
that the premise is by no means universally accepted. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is “Say on Pay” Justified?, 32 REG. 42, 42–44 (2009) (questioning premise of
“say on pay”); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1144 (2005) (arguing that case for systematic
market failure has not been made with respect to executive pay); Xavier Gabaix &
Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 50
(2008) (developing model involving competitive matching of CEO talent and
firms that can explain most observed patterns in CEO pay).
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in order to camouflage executive pay and deflect outrage.6 To the extent
that it is transparent, excessive executive pay may adversely affect worker
morale at lower levels in the organization.7 Excessive pay in the public
company sector may result in increased executive compensation in the private company context and even in the non-profit sphere.8
This Article will touch on these ancillary costs of excessive executive
pay, but its primary focus is on detailing the likely transfer of value to
executives from capital and labor and the assumptions underlying the
analysis.9 This Article also will consider the policy implications of the idea
that shareholders may not bear the full economic “tax” imposed by excessive executive pay. For example, continuing the tax analogy, a transfer of
value from shareholders to executives would be modestly regressive, but a
transfer from labor to executives would be much more so. Recognizing
the likely incidence of excessive executive pay and the fact that suppliers
of non-corporate capital and labor do not even have a representative at
the executive pay bargaining table may provide a rationale for additional
executive pay regulation or a different type of regulation.10
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I provides
data on executive compensation and describes why pay levels may be excessive systematically. The incidence analysis is developed in Part II. Part
III briefly considers other costs of systematically excessive executive pay,
while Part IV discusses the implications of a conclusion that shareholders
are unlikely to bear the full cost of excessive executive pay. The conclusion to this Article briefly considers the application of the incidence analysis developed herein to managerial agency costs generally.
II. THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM
A.

Description of the Problem

The traditional view of the executive pay-setting process is an efficient
or “optimal” contracting view first propounded by Jensen and Meckling.11
Under this model, a board of directors that cannot perfectly observe the
effort, focus, and effectiveness of its agent (the CEO) negotiates a contract
that minimizes such agency costs as (1) monitoring the executive, (2)
6. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 754.
7. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
9. This is not to suggest that these other costs are small. It is certainly possible
that costs resulting from distorted pay design exceed the inefficiencies resulting
from the transfer of value to executives from other stakeholders. See Bebchuk et
al., supra note 2, at 785.
10. Shareholders are represented by a corporation’s directors. Of course, affiliated or “inside” directors are conflicted as to the determination of their compensation, but the unaffiliated, or “outside,” directors are charged with
representing shareholder interests in negotiating executive pay. The extent to
which outside directors serve as faithful shareholder representatives is taken up in
the next Part.
11. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
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bonding by the executive to maximize shareholder value, and (3) the
residual divergence between the actions selected by the executive and
share-value-maximizing actions.12 According to this view, executive compensation is a tool that is used by directors to minimize agency costs.
The competing managerial power view of the executive pay-setting
process posits that the outside directors who are charged with negotiating
executive pay lack the proper incentives and tools to bargain effectively
and that their independence is undermined by executive influence over
the board and by small group dynamics.13 This does not mean that there
are no constraints on executive pay. The managerial power view posits
that outrage among investors and financial analysts will limit the amount
of executive pay and shape its composition. Under this view, executive
compensation is a manifestation of agency costs, rather than or in addition
to being a tool to minimize those costs.
Of course, the managerial power view and the optimal contracting
view of the pay-setting process may coexist, providing relatively more or
less explanatory power at particular firms.14 Moreover, under both theories there is an overriding cap on managerial value extraction that is determined by external market forces—markets for corporate control, capital,
products, and even the managerial labor market. However, external market forces are thought to permit considerable slack, leaving one to question the extent to which such forces actually limit executive rent
extraction.15
This Article assumes that the managerial power view accurately describes the pay-setting process at a significant number of U.S. public companies. That view suggests two major sources of inefficiency. The focus of
much of the literature is on the distortions in compensation design that
follow from an outrage constraint.16 Under the managerial power view,
transparency and salience of pay are critical. If all channels of compensation were perfectly transparent and equally salient to investors and the
financial press, channels would be irrelevant under this model. Outrage
simply would be a function of total appropriation and, although total pay
12. See id.
13. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2.
14. See id. A third view characterizes the compensation setting process as a
team production problem in which the board serves as a mediating hierarch
among competing stakeholders—the executives, employees, creditors, and shareholders—who make firm-specific investments in the company. This theory
predicts that compensation arrangements would not be designed to maximize
shareholder value, but to balance the interests of the stakeholders. See Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247 (1999).
15. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 64–66 (2004); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 71, 75–76 (2003); Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 300–01; Bebchuk et
al., supra note 2, at 786–88; Core et al., supra note 5.
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would remain excessive, firms would structure pay to minimize agency
costs and maximize shareholder value. But appropriation is not transparent. Managers may be able to increase their pay by camouflaging compensation and avoiding outrage. Doing so, however, results in compensation
choices that are not share value maximizing.17
The second source of inefficiency relates to the transfer to executives
of excessive compensation and the distortions in investment behavior that
result. Executives receive more pay than they would in a well-functioning
market. In all likelihood, there is both a systematic and a firm-specific
element to excessive compensation. Managers, boards, and negotiating
processes are heterogeneous. Some boards may negotiate effectively with
respect to executive pay. Importantly, however, as long as executives receive excessive pay at a significant number of firms, pay levels will be systematically higher.
Systematically excessive pay levels would result from the ubiquitous
practice of setting compensation based on the pay practices of peer companies, i.e., “benchmarking.”18 As a result of benchmarking, lax pay practices at some firms tend to drive up executive pay levels generally. The
problem is exacerbated by the Lake Wobegon effect.19 Because no board
is willing to publicly admit that its executives are below average, firms generally seek to pay their executives at or above the fiftieth percentile.20
This practice of benchmarking with targets above the fiftieth percentile
leads to upward ratcheting in executive pay.21 Perversely, the upward
ratcheting problem may have been exacerbated by enhanced executive
compensation disclosure requirements promulgated by the SEC over the
last twenty years. Evidence suggests that enhanced disclosure may have

17. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 786–89. The corporate income tax
results in an analogous distortion in financing and payout decisions. See Rosanne
Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA.
TAX REV. 355, 361 (2010).
18. This process is driven in large part by compensation consultants whose
role is to collect, organize, and report (in redacted form) comprehensive pay information. See John M. Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher
Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 154–55 (2008).
19. See The News from Lake Wobegon, PRAIRIE HOME COMPANION, http://prairie
home.publicradio.org/about/podcast/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (describing
Lake Wobegon as fictional Minnesota town where “all the women are strong, all
the men are good looking, and all the children are above average”).
20. Bizjak et al., supra note 18, at 153 (finding that vast majority of S&P 500
firms sampled “target[ed] pay levels at or above the 50th percentile of the peer
group”). In addition, companies often select peer groups with an eye towards justifying high executive pay levels. See John Bizjak et al., Are All CEOs Above Average? An
Empirical Analysis of Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538
(2011); Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 259 (2010).
21. Bizjak et al., supra note 18, at 155.
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done more to increase below average elements of pay at lagging firms than
to reduce above average pay levels or elements.22
B.

Executive Pay Levels and Growth in Executive Pay

Reports of big executive compensation packages certainly provoke
outrage, but is executive pay economically significant? Is there reason beyond mollifying an outraged public to worry about excessive pay and who
bears the cost? The answer to all of these questions appears to be “yes.”
Top executive pay represents a very significant fraction of corporate earnings, a fraction that has been growing over time along with executive pay
levels generally and with the growing gap between executive pay and the
compensation of rank and file workers. Even if only a small fraction of
executive pay is in a sense “unearned,” the stakes are significant.
Compensation data for senior public company executives is readily
available. For many years, U.S. public companies have been required to
disclose in their annual proxy statements pay data for their “top five” executives, currently defined as the CEO, CFO, and three most highly compensated executives other than the CEO and CFO. S&P’s Execucomp
database collects this data for executives at over two thousand public companies.23 For 2008, aggregate executive compensation for roughly 10,000
Execucomp executives totaled $25 billion, an average of about $2.5 million per top executive.24
Senior executive pay and, in particular, CEO pay, has been increasing
over the last several decades. According to a recent report, the median
value of 2010 CEO compensation at the 350 largest U.S. public companies
was $9.3 million, an increase of over 10% from the previous year.25 CEO
22. For example, Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda find that after disclosure
requirements were enhanced for perks, firms that provided a low level of perks
compared with their peers increased perks in the second year after enhanced disclosure was mandated, while firms that provided a relatively high level of perks did
not reduce them. The authors provide additional evidence suggesting that the
increase in perks by formerly low-perk firms reflected actual ratcheting rather than
simply increased disclosure. Yaniv Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences
of Perk Disclosure (Apr. 3, 2011) (Cornell Univ. Johnson Sch. Research Paper
Series), No. 06-2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108707.
23. The Execucomp universe includes current and former members of the
S&P 1500.
24. These figures are based on the Execucomp variable TDC1. TDC1 is a
grant date measure of executive pay and includes salary, bonus payments, long
term incentive payouts, perks, and the grant date value of stock options and restricted stock. Execucomp also includes a rough measure of realized compensation, coded as TDC2. TDC2 replaces grant date option values with realized option
values. For this group of executives, aggregate compensation as measured by
TDC2 for 2008 was $28.4 billion.
25. See Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 10%, WALL ST. J., May 9,
2011, at B1 (reporting data compiled by Hay Group). Average pay for this group
of CEOs was $10.6 million. The Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2011), http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/php/CEOPAY11.
html#top (presenting study of compensation for CEOs of 350 largest U.S. public
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pay has increased in real terms by 500% or more over the last thirty years.26
The compensation of other senior executives has also risen rapidly, although not as rapidly as CEO pay.27
The fraction of corporate earnings being devoted to compensating
senior executives also has been increasing over time. Bebchuk and Grinstein collected pay data for Execucomp listed executives over the 1993 to
2003 period and estimated pay for U.S. public companies with market capitalization in excess of $50 million that were not listed on Execucomp.
Over the entire period, they estimated that top executive pay constituted
6.6% of earnings. However, between 1993 and 1995, top executive pay
absorbed only about 5% of earnings. Between 2001 and 2003, the fraction
of earnings devoted to top executive pay had increased to almost 10%.28
The growth of executive pay can also be seen in the growing disparity
between top executive pay and the compensation of rank and file workers.29 In 1980, the ratio of average CEO pay to average rank and file
worker pay was 42 to 1. By 1990, that ratio had increased to 100 to 1. At
the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the ratio exceeded 500 to 1. The
ratio declined as executive pay moderated during the financial crisis, but
even in 2009 it continued to exceed 250 to 1.
Analysts have struggled to explain the rapid growth in U.S. executive
pay. Equity compensation, which did not become significant until the
1980s, accounts for almost all of the growth.30 Operating within an optimal contracting approach, Holmstrom and Kaplan argue that the addition
of this risky pay necessitated an overall increase in compensation of riskaverse executives.31 Frydman and (separately) Murphy and Zabojnik explain the growth in CEO pay as following from a shift in the requisite skill
companies). To be sure, pay levels in 2009 were somewhat depressed as a result of
the financial crisis, but the trend remains steadily upward.
26. See Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View
from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 (2010)
(presenting graph depicting increase of over 500%); Gabaix & Landier, supra note
5, at 51 (2008) (finding 500% increase).
27. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
75, 77-80 (2010).
28. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 302.
29. See Executive PayWatch, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/
paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (analyzing compensation data
from “299 companies in the S&P 500 Index”).
30. Frydman & Jenter, supra note 27, at 77–80.
31. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121
(2001); Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2003). This view is
in line with Jensen and Murphy who had argued that improving executive incentives would necessitate paying executives more. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–June 1990, at 138.
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set.32 Formerly, firm-specific skills dominated, limiting outside opportunities, but, increasingly, general management skills dominate, which leads to
greater competition for talent and to managers capturing greater rents.
Recently, Gabaix and Landier have proposed a model involving competitive matching of CEO talent and firms.33 The model predicts that average
compensation should move with firm size, and the model explains the increase in pay over time, as well as cross-industry and cross-country pay observations. The authors find very little dispersion in CEO talent at the
largest firms, but given the tremendous amount of assets under management and a multiplier effect, the model can explain large pay differentials.
On the other hand, Bebchuk and Grinstein analyzed increases in executive pay between 1993 and 2003 and concluded that the growth in pay
could not be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry
mix.34 Taking the managerial power approach, they suggested that the
bull market of the 1990s weakened the outrage constraint, allowing boards
to increase executive pay, and that the design of equity compensation reduced the salience of this pay, permitting transfers of value that would
have been inconceivable if paid in cash.35
The bottom line is that top executive pay is economically significant
and increasingly so. Bebchuk and Grinstein estimate that top executive
pay at non-Execucomp firms with market capitalization in excess of $50
million is in aggregate about two-thirds of executive pay reported in Execucomp.36 Using that figure, a ballpark estimate for 2008 top executive
pay for U.S. public companies with market capitalization in excess of $50
million is about $40 billion.37 Note, moreover, that these figures include
32. Carola Frydman, Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market
for Corporate Executives, 1936–2003 (Nov. 18, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://mitsloan.mit.edu/finance/pdf/frydman-090208.pdf; Kevin J.
Murphy & Ján Zábojnı́k, CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for
Recent Trends, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 192 (2004); Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojnı́k,
Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984376.
33. Gabaix & Landier, supra note 5. The idea that small differences in talent
are consistent with large differences in pay was also explored by Charles P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard. See Charles P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard,
Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (Mar. 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=236089.
34. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 302.
35. Id. at 301–02. In a similar vein, Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck argue that
the favorable accounting treatment of options in the 1990s led boards to systematically undervalue this form of compensation. See Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them,
39 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 44, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 129, 143–45 (2003).
36. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 297.
37. $25 billion aggregate compensation for Execucomp executives plus twothirds times $25 billion equals $41.7 billion.
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only the top five executives at each company. There are likely to be more
than five “senior” executives at many large, public companies, and thus
this figure likely understates the aggregate amount of senior executive pay.
Also, bear in mind that these figures represent annual flows to company
executives, not one-time transfers.
III. WHO BEARS

THE

COST

OF

EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE PAY?

The corporate governance literature assumes, explicitly or implicitly,
that excessive executive pay comes at the expense of shareholders who
bear residual corporate gains and losses.38 This section analogizes systematically excessive pay to a corporate-level tax and explores the implications
of that analogy within the extensive literature on the incidence of the corporate tax. If this analogy holds, we must conclude that it is far from clear
that shareholders bear the cost of systematically excessive executive pay
and that non-corporate capital and/or labor are likely to bear a significant
fraction of the burden.
A.

Systematic and Firm Specific Excess Executive Pay

In thinking about the incidence question it is useful to conceptually
divide excess executive pay between firm-specific excesses and systematic
excesses. To the extent that executive pay is greater at a particular firm
because of a particularly strong CEO or particularly lax outside directors,
the cost is likely to be borne entirely by that firm’s shareholders. If we
assume that the firm is engaged in competitive products and labor markets (below the executive level),39 it would be difficult for existing shareholders to pass on such firm-specific costs to consumers or employees. If
the firm collects monopoly rents, those rents will simply be reduced by the
excessive compensation. Lenders to the firm—bondholders or banks—
will not be affected by excessive pay that does not materially threaten solvency. New suppliers of equity—either purchasers of a new issuance of
shares, or purchasers of outstanding shares—will demand a discount to
reflect the reduction in equity returns caused by extraction of excessive
compensation. Thus, existing shareholders, i.e., “old” equity, should bear
the cost of existing excessive pay and of any firm-specific increase in executive pay.
But what about executive pay that is at a higher level, systematically,
than would prevail in a well-functioning market? Systematically higher pay
that results from lax governance at some firms, comparative benchmarking, and an executive labor pool that is infected by these practices would
seem to be analogous to a corporate-level income tax. Like an actual tax,
the economic tax created by systematically excessive pay reduces net shareholder returns across the board. If the “tax” may be avoided by shifting
38. Bebchuk et al., supra note 2.
39. Note that there is no inherent inconsistency in assuming market failure in
the executive labor market and assuming an efficient rank and file labor market.
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investment into other domestic sectors or by shifting capital abroad, those
capital flows will affect the incidence of systematically excessive pay.
Of course, there are differences between actual corporate taxes and
this economic tax that might affect the incidence analysis. First, the actual
corporate income tax is exogenously determined, while executive pay
levels are to a large extent endogenous. But the argument here is that, to
some extent, excessive executive pay at any particular firm is exogenous.
Second, the design of the actual corporate tax (a percentage of profits) is
quite different from the design of the economic tax arising from excessive
executive pay (which may provide useful incentives). Third, the corporate
income tax is relatively transparent,40 while excessive compensation is
much less transparent. Nonetheless, as further discussed below, it is not
obvious that any of these differences seriously weakens the analogy between the corporate tax and systematically excessive pay.
For the sake of pursuing and unpacking the analogy, let us suppose
that there has been an economic shock that has loosened the outrage constraint and allowed executives to extract increased pay across the board.
We can use Bebchuk and Grinstein’s suggestion that the bull market of
the 1990s loosened the outrage constraint and allowed for increased
pay.41 The question, then, is what is the incidence of the systematic increase in executive pay?42
The increase in pay comes directly from the corporate treasury, but of
course the treasurer does not bear the cost. As with a corporate tax, we
must look beyond the legal fiction of the corporation to determine which
individuals bear the cost of the increase in executive pay.43 In the first
instance, shareholders bear the cost. Shareholders will be unable to shift
the burden of the increase in compensation in the short term because
labor and other contracts are fixed.44 Over time, however, the incidence
of increased systematic excess pay may shift as a new investment equilibrium develops. In order to consider how that equilibrium might evolve, it
will be helpful to delve into the literature on the incidence of the corporate income tax.
40. The corporate tax rules are perfectly transparent. Corporate tax returns
are not public documents, however, and it can be difficult to reconcile actual tax
liabilities with accrued tax liabilities reported in company financial statements. See,
e.g., Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An
Introduction to the Issues, 19 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 101, 106 (2005) (describing why
company financial disclosures do not provide clear picture of tax liabilities).
41. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 300–01.
42. The incidence of a baseline level of excessive pay and of a change in excessive pay may differ. Because policy choices would affect the extent of excessive
pay, it seems most useful to focus on the incidence of a change in excessive compensation. See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We
Know, 20 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that analysis of incidence of corporate tax changes is more meaningful than overall tax incidence analysis).
43. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 79–80 (4th ed. 2008).
44. Cf. Auerbach, supra note 42.
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A Brief Review of the Theory and Evidence on
the Incidence of Corporate Taxes

The corporate income tax incidence literature goes back fifty years to
the seminal work of Arnold Harberger.45 For many years, incidence analysis was mainly theoretical. Unfortunately, theoretical approaches have
failed to resolve the question of who bears the burden of corporate taxation, as results are highly dependent on assumptions. Recent years have
seen an increase in empirical analyses of corporate tax incidence, but
these studies are also open to various criticisms that limit their persuasiveness. Nonetheless, we do know more about corporate tax incidence than
we once did, and it is fair to say that the consensus among economists is
that it is unlikely that shareholders bear the entire burden of an increase
in corporate taxes in an open economy and that it is likely that non-corporate capital and labor bear a significant fraction of the burden.46
In the early 1960s, Harberger analyzed corporate tax incidence employing a general equilibrium model that included two sectors (corporate
and non-corporate) and two factors of production (labor and capital).47
Harberger assumed a closed economy and a fixed supply of labor and capital. In Harberger’s model, a tax on the corporate sector was borne not by
corporate shareholders alone but by all holders of capital in the economy.
Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija explain the Harberger model by analogizing
to the imposition of a toll on one of two parallel highways.48 At first, those
who drive on the road with the new toll bear the entire cost. However,
over time, drivers abandon the toll road for the non-toll road, which increases congestion and the cost of using the non-toll road and reduces the
congestion and cost of using the toll road. In equilibrium, the total cost of
driving on the toll and non-toll roads must be the same. Similarly, when a
tax is imposed on investors in one sector of the economy, reducing returns
to that sector, capital will shift into the non-taxed sector, depressing returns in that sector and increasing returns in the taxed sector, until aftertax returns equilibrate.49
The Harberger model of corporate tax incidence is quite elegant, but
its assumptions of a closed economy and fixed factors of production are
unrealistic. Much of the theoretical work since Harberger has been focused on exploring the incidence question under more realistic, open
45. Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 215 (1962).
46. See Altshuler et al., supra note 17, at 360-70 (summarizing theoretical and
empirical work on corporate tax incidence).
47. Harberger, supra note 45.
48. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 43.
49. One may ask why workers bear none of the burden under the Harberger
model. The answer, in a nutshell, is that Harberger assumes that workers receive
pay equal to the marginal product of their labor and that the marginal product is a
function of the amount of capital invested in the economy. Under his model, the
total amount of capital invested in the economy is fixed, labor can move between
the corporate and non-corporate sectors, and thus total returns to labor are fixed.
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economy assumptions. Recent theoretical work typically assumes that capital is more or less mobile internationally, but that labor is not.
Randolph, for example, shows that in an open economy setting, an
increase in the domestic corporate tax rate causes capital to shift abroad.50
Total returns to capital are maintained on a world-wide basis, but foreign
labor benefits because increased foreign capital improves productivity and
wages, while domestic labor suffers for the opposite reason. Randolph’s
base estimate is that domestic labor bears about 70% of the cost of an
increase in the corporate tax, while domestic capital bears about 30%.51
The burden borne by capital increases, however, as the size of the domestic economy increases relative to the world economy and as the size of the
domestic corporate sector increases relative to the overall domestic economy.52 This analysis assumes, of course, that a change in the corporate tax
rate in one country is not matched in other countries. If corporate income tax rates rise and fall in unison around the world, open economy
models collapse into closed economy models, and Harberger’s results return to the fore.53
The incidence determined by open economy models is very sensitive
to other underlying assumptions. Gravelle and Smetters show that Randolph’s results are highly sensitive to assumptions concerning the degree
to which domestic and foreign traded goods substitute for one another
and the degree to which investors substitute between domestic and foreign
investments.54 They replicate Randolph’s results when they assume perfect substitutability along both dimensions. But when they employ more
reasonable (in their view) assumptions about these factors, their model
indicates that domestic capital bears 70% to 90% of the burden of the
corporate income tax.55
Alan Auerbach introduces further complications into the theoretical
analysis of corporate tax incidence, many of which suggest that shareholders may in fact bear a considerable portion of the burden of additional
corporate-level taxes.56 For example, Auerbach stresses the importance of
timing. He explains that an increase in corporate taxes reduces asset val50. William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax 43
(Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf.
51. Id. at 44.
52. Id. at 36–38.
53. See Matthew H. Jensen & Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 131 TAX NOTES 1083, 1085 (2011) (citing Arnold C.
Harberger, Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on What is Known, Unknown, and Unknowable, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 283
(John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008)).
54. Jane G. Gravelle & Kent A. Smetters, Does the Open Economy Assumption
Really Mean that Labor Bears the Burden of a Capital Income Tax?, 6 B.E. J. ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 1 (2006).
55. Id. at 25 tbl.2.
56. Auerbach, supra note 42.
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ues and future rates of return. The cost of the former is borne by existing
shareholders. The cost of the latter is borne by new shareholders, other
providers of capital, labor, or all three constituencies, depending on the
considerations modeled by Harberger, Randolph, Gravelle and Smetters,
and others. The degree to which the tax is borne by existing shareholders
depends on the responsiveness of capital to the imposition of a tax.57
Auerbach also suggests several reasons that shareholders may not be able
to shift the burden of taxes even over the long run. For example, to the
extent that the corporate tax is a tax on economic rents, such as monopoly
profits, or on other advantages that are specific to the corporate form,
shareholders will not be able to shift the burden of the tax.58 As Altshuler,
Harris, and Toder suggest, given Auerbach’s insights, it is possible that
shareholders bear most (or even all) of the long-run costs associated with
an increase in the corporate income tax.59
Given the indeterminacy of the theoretical literature on incidence,
several economists have attempted to get at the question from an empirical angle. Most have found that an increase in corporate tax rates burdens
labor to a significant extent. For example, using cross-country differences
in corporate income tax rates and wage rates, Hassett and Mathur found
that a one percent increase in corporate income tax rates was associated
with a one percent reduction in wage rates.60 Desai, Foley, and Hines utilized data from American multinational firms in estimating that between
45% and 75% of the burden of corporate taxes is borne by labor, with the
balance borne by capital.61
Unfortunately, empirical work in this area is also subject to criticism.
Gravelle and Hungerford have criticized the methodology employed in
these studies,62 and they and others have raised broader concerns.63 For
example, burden shifting should be a long-term phenomenon, but these
studies capture relatively short-run effects. Moreover, some recent empirical studies provide implausibly large burdens on labor.64 It is not clear
how much weight should be placed on these empirical studies.65
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Altshuler et al., supra note 17, at 361.
60. Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Taxes and Wages (Mar. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/24063.
61. Mihir A. Desai et al., Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm, FIN.
MGMT., Spring 2007, at 5.
62. JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CORPORATE TAX REFORM:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2007).
63. WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OTA PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 101 (2007).
64. Altshuler et al., supra note 17, at 368 (citing work by Gentry and by Gravelle and Hungerford).
65. Altshuler, Harris, and Toder take a dim view: “empirical studies to date
contribute little, if anything, to resolving the question of who actually bears the
burden of the corporate income tax. We are left to rely on theoretical models
. . . .” Id. at 369.
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In sum, setting aside the special considerations discussed by
Auerbach, the consensus among economists is that the burden of a corporate income tax in an open economy is shifted to a significant degree to
non-corporate capital and to labor. But at that point the consensus ends.
The lack of agreement is seen in the various approaches taken by government agencies in estimating the distribution of the overall burden of
taxes. In its analyses, the Treasury Department assumes that the burden of
the corporate income tax is borne by all holders of capital.66 The Congressional Budget Office utilizes various assumptions ranging from 100%
of the burden borne by capital to 100% borne by labor.67 The Joint Committee on Taxation ignores the incidence of the corporate tax altogether
in determining the overall incidence of U.S. taxes,68 an approach that is
clearly wrong, but somewhat understandable under the circumstances.
C.

The Incidence of Systematically Excessive Executive Pay

This section explores the implications of the admittedly indeterminate corporate tax incidence literature for systematically excessive executive pay. If systematically excessive executive pay is analogous to a tax on
the corporate sector, the primary implication is that shareholders may
bear a portion of the cost for the reasons suggested by Auerbach, but that
otherwise the burden is shared by non-corporate capital, labor, or both.
This section considers various reasons that the analogy might or might not
be sound, but concludes that the analogy is reasonably persuasive.
If the analogy is sound, the implication of the Harberger model
would be that the cost of systematically excessive executive pay would at
first be borne by shareholders, but that over time capital would shift to
sectors that do not suffer from excess executive pay. In equilibrium,
Harberger’s model predicts that corporate shareholders would bear the
incidence of excess executive pay pro rata with other suppliers of capital in
the economy.69
An important assumption in maintaining the analogy between the
corporate income tax and systematically excessive executive pay under the
Harberger model is that the executive pay excesses do not infect the entire
economy. In other words, it is important that investors be able to avoid an
increase in executive pay by shifting their capital to other sectors. This
seems to be a reasonable assumption. It seems likely that excesses in the
public company executive pay market would infect pay levels at some private companies and perhaps at non-profits. But non-profits, of course, are
not an investment target. More importantly, there would seem to be a
66. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 43.
67. Id.; Jensen & Mathur, supra note 53, at 1083.
68. Jensen & Mathur, supra note 53, at 1083.
69. This is not to suggest that these are necessarily different individuals.
Many shareholders will also hold non-corporate investments.
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large amount of investment capital that would not be tainted, such as
owner occupied housing.
Another important assumption is that markets other than the executive labor market are reasonably efficient. There is little reason to think
that market failure in the executive pay-setting process results in inefficiencies in the products, capital, or (non-executive) labor markets. It may
be true that executives with power are able to pay their underlings at an
above market rate, but executives with power should have the same interest as shareholders in optimizing compensation below the executive suite.
The analogy between the corporate tax and excessive pay appears to
remain strong as we move from a closed to an open economy setting. A
systematic increase in U.S. executive pay that reduces returns on domestic
shares should lead to an exodus of capital that reduces domestic wage
rates in equilibrium. The degree to which this will be the case, and the
degree to which domestic capital and labor bear the burden, would depend on the substitutability of foreign and domestic traded goods just as it
does in the corporate tax incidence analysis.
Of course, one might think a reduction in domestic labor productivity
and wages associated with a flight of capital abroad would negatively impact executive compensation, and this would be true in a competitive executive labor market in which executives received compensation equal to
the marginal product of their labor. If so, capital flight would act as a selfcorrecting brake on excessive executive pay. But the assumption here is
that this particular market is not efficient and that an outrage constraint
rather than marginal productivity caps compensation.
The open economy model would collapse into a closed economy
model if changes in systematically excessive U.S. executive pay were
matched abroad, but despite the fact that executives are more mobile internationally than rank and file workers, cross-country differences in executive compensation suggest that there is not a global executive labor
market. Cross country comparisons of executive pay practices suggest that
U.S. executive pay remains exceptional, with U.S. executives receiving
more compensation than their international peers at comparably sized
companies and with U.S. executives receiving a much larger fraction of
their compensation in the form of equity.70 These differences do not in
70. See BRIAN J. HALL, INCENTIVE STRATEGY II: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 6–7 (2002) (providing data demonstrating greater total pay
and greater equity pay for U.S. executives than for executives of similarly sized
firms abroad but arguing that U.S. style pay practices are spreading internationally); Nuno G. Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide: (Why) Are U.S. Top Executives Paid
More? 1 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 255, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639 (finding that U.S. executives are
paid more than their foreign counterparts and receive more equity pay but concluding that differences are largely explained by firm, ownership, and board characteristics and by riskiness of equity-based compensation); Randall S. Thomas,
International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends 8 (Vanderbilt Law
Sch., Research Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265
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themselves confirm that U.S. executive pay is excessive. Some commentators have suggested that because of differences in ownership structure or
culture, executives may be more important to the success or failure of U.S.
firms than foreign firms.71 Nonetheless, increases or decreases in systematically excessive executive pay in the United States are unlikely to be
matched abroad.
What about the other differences between the economic “tax” of systematically excessive executive pay and our actual corporate tax? As noted
above, the apparent difference in exogeneity does not survive close scrutiny. Once one understands how excessive pay levels at poorly governed
firms infect other firms through the benchmarking process, excessive pay
appears to be no less exogenous than the corporate tax. To be sure, corporate directors could adopt another approach. They could screen potential benchmark firms based on the quality of their corporate governance.
But given current practices, systematically excessive pay is, to a large degree, exogenous.
Even if boards are price takers in terms of the overall level of executive pay, they have some flexibility to design compensation to optimize
incentives. In this respect, the economic tax of excessive pay differs from
the corporate tax. But the difference seems unimportant from an incidence perspective for two reasons. First, given the interest of executives
and boards in camouflaging excessive pay, design discretion may be limited. Second, efficient design can only mitigate the cost of excessive pay; it
cannot totally eliminate it.
Finally, there is the difference in certainty and transparency. The corporate tax is relatively certain and transparent; excessive pay is less so.
But, once again, this difference does not seem to undermine the incidence analogy. Investors cannot exactly calculate excessive compensation,
but, at the margin, excessive pay will reduce returns in the corporate sector, and investors will respond to those returns. Presumably, the effect
would be similar to the impact of insider trading on equity markets. Commentators generally agree that equity investors would respond to increased insider trading by reallocating their capital away from the infected
market.72
In sum, the analogy between the corporate income tax and systematically excessive executive pay seems reasonably sound, which suggests that
the incidence of systematically excessive pay is similar to that of the corpo122 (demonstrating that non-U.S. executives receive less total compensation and
less performance-oriented pay, but also providing evidence of shift towards U.S.
pay practices).
71. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 842–43; Susan J. Stabile, My Executive
Makes More Than Your Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 63, 67 n.18 (2001) (citing IRA T. KAY, CEO PAY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: HELPING THE U.S. WIN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC WAR 25 (1998)).
72. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 274 (1986); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 808
(1980).
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rate income tax. The corporate tax incidence question has not been resolved and may never be resolved,73 but assuming that the analogy is a
good one, the latest thinking on incidence suggests that it would be inappropriate to assume that shareholders necessarily bear the entire cost of
excessive executive pay.
IV. OTHER COSTS

OF

SYSTEMATICALLY EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE PAY

The primary thrust of this Article concerns the incidence of systematically excessive executive pay. But incidence analysis only tells us who is at
the other end of the transfer to executives. There are also social costs of
systematically excessive executive pay, which arise from inefficiencies that
are created as a result of this transfer.
Whatever its incidence, systematically excessive executive pay dampens incentives to invest in the U.S. corporate sector. As Auerbach explains, the corporate income tax and, by analogy, systematically excessive
executive pay distort the allocation of capital between either the corporate
sector and the domestic non-corporate sector (under the Harberger
model) or between domestic and foreign investments (under open economy models).74 Unless the shift is offsetting some other distortion, a tax
on one sector of production introduces unnecessary deadweight loss.75
As noted above, there are other costs and distortions associated with
excessive executive pay at large, public companies. First, there may be
externalities. Systematically excessive pay at large public companies may
infect pay levels at private companies and even in the non-profit sector, if
these organizations compete with public companies for the same pool of
executives. The extent to which the executive labor pool is common to
these organizations is unclear. Closely held, family-owned companies may
not compete for the same pool. On the other hand, one would think that
portfolio companies owned by private equity, venture capital, and hedge
funds often would compete for the same pool of executives, as would some
large non-profits, such as hospitals, that are in the same product market as
for-profit organizations.76
Excessive executive pay in these sectors represents a transfer and may
distort capital allocation, as well. To some extent, however, the infection
of these other markets may mitigate the distortions created in the public
company sector. If capital fleeing one market faces the same economic
“tax” in an alternative market, there would be no distortion. Ultimately,
whether infection of other markets magnifies or mitigates capital alloca73. Auerbach, supra note 42.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 9 (explaining that more general tax on capital income would not
create this distortion).
76. See David I. Walker, Executive Pay Lessons from Private Equity, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1209, 1218 (2011) (discussing competition for executives and criticizing prior studies conducted on executive pay).
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tion distortion is an empirical question that turns on international capital
mobility and similar factors.
A more direct ancillary cost of excessive executive pay in the public
company sector arises from diminished morale of workers below the senior executive suite.77 Evidence suggests that vertical pay inequity leads to
increased employee turnover and reduced product quality, and systematically excessive pay exacerbates pay inequity.78
Finally, to the extent that executive pay is limited by an outrage constraint, firms and executives are motivated to adopt compensation design
practices that obscure the amount of compensation delivered. Because
salience plays no role in efficient compensation design, this distortion
tends to reduce share value. Commentators have pointed to heavy reliance on stock options, which are difficult to value, and on pension benefits, which formerly were poorly disclosed, as examples of this distortion.
Of course, this effect is not a result of excessive pay. Systematically excessive pay and distortions in pay design both flow from defects in the executive pay bargaining process. Hence, further elaboration of this point lies
beyond the scope of this Article.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The main message of this Article is that we should not assume that
excessive executive pay necessarily comes at the expense of shareholders.
The burden may be shifted in part to other investors and to labor. If one
accepts this conclusion, how would one think differently about corporate
governance and corporate governance regulation?
First, for some, the possibility that labor bears a significant fraction of
the cost of excessive pay will make regulation more attractive because the
stakes are greater, or at least different. One way to think of this is that,
distortions aside, a transfer from shareholders to executives represents a
transfer from the rich to the super rich. Even accounting for shares held
by mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutions, share ownership is
heavily skewed towards the wealthiest U.S. households.79 Continuing the
77. See Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 146 (2002) (arguing that increases in CEO pay, particularly during
economic downturns, are likely to decimate employee morale).
78. Douglas M. Cowherd & David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice
Theory, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 302, 316 (1992) (showing “substantial positive relationship” between product quality and pay equity between executives and hourly workers); James B. Wade et al., Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and
Executive Compensation, 17 ORG. SCIENCE 527, 539 (2006) (finding that pay inequity
leads to higher levels of employee turnover).
79. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze—an Update to 2007 58 tbl.15a (Levy Econ. Inst.
of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 589, 2010), available at http://www.levyinstitute.
org/pubs/wp_589.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss3/11

18

Walker: Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (and Other
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR311.txt

2012]

COST

OF

unknown

Seq: 19

26-NOV-12

EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

11:30

671

tax analogy, a transfer from shareholders to executives is modestly regressive. On the other hand, a transfer from labor to executives would be
highly regressive. A transfer from all holders of capital in the economy,
including holders of owner-occupied housing, would likely fall somewhere
in between.
If labor or some mix of labor and capital bear the burden, systematically excessive executive pay contributes in two ways to the growing inequality of wealth in this country. Of course, the executive class is wealthier
as a result of the transfer. But wages and returns on all sorts of investments may be lower following the shift in equilibrium investing in an open
economy. Recognition of this two-sided impact on inequality may increase
the impetus for a regulatory response to excessive executive pay. We
might be more eager to attempt to rein in pay, given a better understanding of the distributional consequences, despite the difficulty and potential
unintended consequences of doing so.80
Second, recognizing that labor and non-corporate capital may bear a
large chunk of the burden of excessive compensation may affect our approach to pay regulation. To the extent that the cost of excessive pay is
borne solely by shareholders, regulatory responses aimed at increasing
shareholder power vis-à-vis management, such as mandating shareholder
“say on pay,” may be reasonable and effective. But shareholder-centric
approaches to improving pay processes may be less compelling to the extent that shareholders are able to pass on the costs. To be sure, shareholders would still have a strong incentive to rein in firm-specific excess pay,
the cost of which is not passed on, and as a result, shareholders may still be
in the best position to address executive pay generally. However, viewing
the impact on labor and non-corporate capital as an externality suggests
that shareholders may be inadequately motivated to address executive pay
excesses and that different or additional regulatory responses may be
dictated.81
80. Regulation of executive pay is perilous, and is not to be undertaken
lightly. As discussed above, even the apparently innocuous act of requiring enhanced disclosure of executive pay may have contributed to upward ratcheting in
pay levels. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. More intrusive regulation,
such as the adoption of I.R.C. § 162(m), which limited the deductibility of senior
executive pay that is not performance based, often results in unintended consequences. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2011). In the specific case of § 162(m), the intervention is thought to have contributed substantially to the widespread adoption of
stock option compensation, which led to excessive levels of pay during the 1990s
stock market boom and which may have encouraged excessive risk taking, contributing to the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Elsewhere, I argue that despite these
cautionary tales, a tax based approach to regulating executive pay may be warranted. See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-50, 2011) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1944115.
81. A similar issue has been identified in the context of regulating executive
pay in the financial industry. In that context, the idea is that bank shareholders
have a socially suboptimal incentive to manage risk-taking incentives because taxpayers, as a result of explicit or implicit guarantees, bear a portion of losses but not
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VI. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by briefly considering the broader implications of
the incidence analysis that is the heart of this Article. According to the
managerial power view of the compensation setting process, excessive executive pay is just one manifestation of the agency costs that arise from the
separation of ownership and control in the modern U.S. public company.
Is there any reason to think that the incidence of other agency cost manifestations, such as insider trading or self-dealing, in general, would differ?
I think the answer is “no.” Changes in legal rules, enforcement efforts,
and perhaps even in business practices that increase managerial agency
costs will be borne by shareholders in the first instance. Assuming, however, that these costs are perceived by investors and that they are unique to
or are of significantly greater consequence in the corporate sphere, over
time investors will respond by reallocating capital away from the more
heavily “taxed” corporate sector. When that happens, returns to capital,
corporate and non-corporate, domestic and international, will be affected,
as will the productivity of labor and returns to labor. The incidence of
corporate agency costs should mirror that of the corporate tax.
This is not an entirely new observation. Many commentators, including Clark and Scott, have argued that shareholders would respond to
more prevalent insider trading by demanding a greater rate of return and
that capital allocation would be impacted.82 What is new, I think, is the
suggestion that the impact would not be limited to company founders,
managers, and shareholders, but might be felt by other suppliers of capital
to the economy and by labor.
Consider the following examples. Sticking first with insider trading,
recent, high profile prosecutions in the U.K. apparently have led to a reduction in insider trading in that country.83 We have also witnessed a
number of high profile insider trading prosecutions within the last year on
this side of the pond, including the conviction of Galleon head Raj
Rajaratnam, which resulted in a record eleven year prison term.84 In all
likelihood, these prosecutions have led to reduced insider trading in this
country, as well. If so, the benefit may extend beyond shareholders to
other investors and labor. Second, enhanced SEC disclosure regulations
of gains associated with risky bets. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205,
1214 (2011). The issues are similar, but not identical. An asymmetry in the context of general oversight of executive pay would arise as a result of shareholders
bearing a larger fraction of monitoring costs (through personal time and effort)
than of residual losses resulting from suboptimal monitoring.
82. CLARK, supra note 72, at 274; Scott, supra note 72, at 808.
83. See Brooke Masters, Suspicious Pre-Deal Trades Fall Sharply, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 14, 2011, at 1-1 (reporting on drop in suspicious trading activity
before U.K. mergers and acquisitions after high-profile Financial Services Authority prosecutions).
84. Susan Pulliam & Chad Bray, Trader Draws Record Sentence, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 2011, at A1.
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have placed greater pressure on executive perks. Although the dollar
amounts are relatively small, the benefit likely flows beyond shareholders.
Third, suppose that the Delaware legislature were to amend “rules of the
road” provisions, such as those dealing with midstream charter amendments or staggered boards, which would affect agency costs generally.
Again, there is little reason to think that the costs or benefits would be
limited to founders, managers, and shareholders.
Extending the tax incidence analogy to corporate agency costs generally does not change the underlying message; it simply amplifies it. Individuals outside the founder-manager-shareholder circle have a stake in
minimizing corporate agency costs; shareholders may be inadequately motivated to minimize these costs; and agency costs likely contribute more to
inequality of wealth in the United States than we previously realized.
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